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affects much philosophy, not just ethical or political philosophy but also 
metaphysics and epistemology.
A number of chapters deal with the intersection of childhood with 
various identities: gender, race, and disability. Religion comes up most in 
Clayton’s chapter on political neutrality. It’s absent in other cases where 
one might think it could come up, such as Gina Schouten’s chapter on 
schooling, which focuses almost exclusively on the aims and methods 
of public education. A few times when religion comes up in the volume, 
it’s treatment was critical (though this isn’t to say unfairly critical), as for 
example Colin Macleod’s discussion of how some religious fundamental-
ists who “falsely claim that LBGTQ persons are, in virtue of their sexual 
orientation, bad parents are themselves responsible for creating a social 
environment that harms children” (171).
In a few of the canvased debates, Christian philosophers (and religious 
individuals more generally) may have particular considerations that 
aren’t fully treated in the volume, such as religious reasons for becom-
ing parents, how to understand parental partiality, or issues related to the 
composition of the family (a topic covered in Daniela Cutas’s chapter). 
But these limitations are, as indicated earlier, inevitable given the nature 
of such a volume. And these omissions can serve as an opportunity for 
Christian philosophers to develop distinctly Christian work on these 
issues in the future.
As someone who’s edited a large handbook/companion before, I’m 
aware that it’s very difficult but incredibly valuable to get the contributors 
to make connections across their respective chapters. On this score, the 
editors have succeeded well.
While The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Childhood and Children 
is neither a work in Christian philosophy nor philosophy of religion, 
there is much in it that Christian philosophers will find engaging. Indeed, 
I  believe the editors have succeeded in putting together an incredibly 
worthwhile volume that has the potential to expand the range of projects 
the Christian philosophical community is collectively engaged in.
God, Existence, and Fictional Objects: The Case for Meinongian Theism, by 
John-Mark L. Miravalle. Bloomsbury, 2018. Pp. 192. $114 (hardback).
MARY BETH WILLARD, Weber State University
In God, Existence, and Fictional Objects: The Case for Meinongian Theism, 
John-Mark L. Miravalle marshals an unexpected soldier, meinongianism, 
into a series of well-known battles in contemporary analytic theology. 
By meinongianism (and here I follow his usage in eliminating the initial 
capital), Miravalle means the thesis that there are some objects that do 
not exist, but nevertheless possess properties (41). Typical examples of 
non-existent objects for Miravalle include fictional objects like Sherlock 
Holmes, who does not exist, but nevertheless is an object about which 
many true things can be said: Holmes is a detective, solves crimes with 
his (also non-existent) friend Watson, and so forth. The appeal of mei-
nongianism for Miravalle lies less in its putative ability to make sense 
of fictional discourse, and more in the potential of its application to 
a range of philosophically puzzling theological claims, such as “God 
knew about you before you ever existed” (2). Non-existent objects have 
being, but not existence, and if they remain uncreated, they remain 
independent of God. God has knowledge of non-existent objects, and 
as it will turn out, God’s creative power consists in bestowing existence 
on non-existents.
The first two chapters introduce the main competitors to meinongi-
anism regarding the question of non-existents. The first chapter considers 
nominalist accounts, which generally proceed from the assumption that 
sentences about non-existents cannot successfully refer to non-existents to 
the strategy of paraphrasing away apparent references. The second chapter 
concerns realism about fictional objects, focusing mostly on van Inwagen’s 
theory of creatures of fiction (“Existence, Ontological Commitment, and 
Fictional Entities,” in Michael J. Loux and Dean W. Zimmerman (eds.), The 
Oxford Handbook of Metaphysics (Oxford University Press, 2003)), accord-
ing to which fictional characters exist due to the creative actions of their 
authors, but that not all sentences about them should be read literally. 
Sherlock Holmes was created in 1889 by Sir Arthur Conan Doyle, but it 
is only according to the fiction that he solves crimes. The third chapter 
closes out Part One, and introduces Miravalle’s preferred realism, mei-
nongianism, and defends it.
The arguments presented here will be familiar to anyone who is con-
versant with the growing literature on fictional objects. Each competi-
tor accounts for some intuitions well while struggling with others. The 
advantage of meinongianism lies in its relatively minimal use of para-
phrase and preservation of some commonsense intuition; Miravalle 
makes a fair case for meinongianism as a legitimate but often overlooked 
alternative. The costs lie in separating existence from “to be” and a tre-
mendous population explosion, for those of us with the proverbial taste 
for desert landscapes. I found myself wishing Miravalle had addressed 
the following kind of objection. According to Miravalle, authors do not 
create characters, but merely describe them, discovering them and being 
the first to have ideas about these non-existent objects, which they then 
share in stories. Imagine two authors from different long-lost civiliza-
tions, who independently describe the sun god in identical ways. The 
anthropologists assure us there was no cross-cultural contact. It seems 
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right to describe the authors as writing about different sun gods, but the 
meinongian position will have to be that they’re both referring to the 
same object, a non-existent sun god.
In Parts Two, Three, and Four, Miravalle argues that accepting meinon-
gianism will help resolve a number of puzzles in philosophical theology. 
A key premise in many of the arguments that follow is that non-existent 
objects are independent of God. In the beginning, so to speak, there was 
God, and a multitude of objects that had being without having existence. 
God has knowledge of the non-existent objects, and decides freely to 
bestow existence on some of them. There were horses and unicorns in the 
beginning, but only horses were blessed with existence.
The fourth chapter introduces the cosmological and ontological argu-
ments for the existence of God. Miravalle takes an interesting approach for 
the cosmological argument, arguing that the question why does something 
exist? cannot be satisfactorily posed without positing non-existent objects 
(74–75). If there were no non-existent objects, according to one influen-
tial line of thought, there would be no need to explain existent objects at 
all. “Why are there horses?” would have to be understood as a question 
about the concept of horse, or about why we group the quadrupeds we see 
together, or some similar question. Once non-existents are part of the ontol-
ogy, then the question of why horses exist becomes the question of why 
God chose to bring horses from non-existence into existence, capturing the 
intuitions behind the cosmological argument. In Chapter 5, Miravalle con-
siders the link between the ontological argument and non-existent objects 
(like Gaunilo’s perfect island) and agrees with the philosophical consen-
sus that the theses must stand or fall together, but parts ways by arguing 
that they both stand.
In Part Three, Miravalle considers the nature of creation. In Chapter 6, 
Miravalle explores how meinongianism offers a way to rescue the doc-
trine of creation ex nihilo. One might argue that the diversity of crea-
tion cannot be explained without diversity from the very beginning. 
Traditional monotheism holds that God alone exists at the beginning of 
the universe, so it seems impossible to say whence the diversity that we 
see around us came. If there is diversity from the very beginning, then 
God’s creative activity consists in moving the building blocks of nature 
around like so many Lego bricks. If meinongianism is true, Miravalle 
argues, God’s creative activity consists in bestowing existence on those 
nonexistents that God chooses to create. The nonexistents provide the 
needed diversity, without committing the theist to diversity in existence 
at the beginning.
Thus, the diversity problem is solved, though not without some fallout, 
which Chapter 7 addresses. If God’s essence is existence, and existence is a 
property, then God is both existence itself, and a property. If God bestows 
the property of existence on choiceworthy non-existents, then creation 
does not add to God’s being, but shares in it (111). This position is known 
as panentheism, everything-in-God, and it’s not without controversy 
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theologically. Miravalle argues that panentheism better accounts for the 
traditional divine attributes, and that adding meinongianism to panenthe-
ism allows his account to avoid the collapse into pantheism that plagues 
other panentheistic theories. The pantheist holds that everything is God, 
but Miravalle argues that his panentheism can avoid that conclusion 
because everything that exists, while it exists because of God’s decision to 
bring it into existence, has being separate from God. Miravalle writes that a 
real dog has other features besides existence (viz., properties appropriate 
to a canine) that God does not have, and “those canine features make the 
dog not God” (115).
Part Four considers questions of divine providence, evil, and freedom. 
Chapter 8 presents a very interesting proposal regarding middle knowledge, 
God’s knowledge of the “counterfactuals of freedom,” counterfactuals 
that correspond to every possible free creature, and every possible circum-
stance in which that creature could act freely. On the molinist proposal, 
these counterfactuals are independent of God’s will, and God knows each 
one. When combined with God’s knowledge of what God will create, God 
can know the entire history of the world. The hope is that molinism pro-
vides a way for God to know what will happen without a commitment 
to theological fatalism, where creatures have no freedom. One objection 
to molinism, however, is that middle knowledge lacks an object. It can’t 
be the knowledge of an event, or what would have happened if the event 
had gone otherwise because God has middle knowledge prior to creating 
anything. Miravalle’s solution hybridizes molinism with meinongianism. 
God’s middle knowledge consists in God’s knowledge of non-existents. 
As the non-existents are ontologically prior to God’s knowledge of them, 
God’s decision to actualize them does not, Miravalle suggests, negate 
their freedom.
The ninth chapter deals with a small corner of the problem of evil, the 
question of how to understand evil as a privation. Evil, on this conception, 
is the absence of goodness. The harm which occurs when one man strikes 
another in anger is not a privation, but on Miravalle’s view, nor is it evil. 
The evil is the deficiency in the man’s character; the anger is the result. The 
sinner is lacking a property that they should have, resisting divine grace. 
Miravalle uses the resources of meinongianism to develop the beginnings 
of an explanation of moral evil. All people begin as non-existents, and 
their properties come and go with time. Suppose that some properties, 
such as moral rectitude remain non-existent due to the person’s free 
choices. The person might be “perversely unresponsive to God’s existen-
tial generosity” (151); but the person did not have to be that way, and so 
is morally responsible. Were they to choose otherwise, God’s grace would 
bring those character traits into existence. Miravalle argues that non-ex-
istents can resist being brought into existence. This might strike some as 
surprising, but Miravalle’s response (152–153) is worth a look.
To return to Chapter 7, I’m not convinced that Miravalle can avoid the 
collapse of meinongian panentheism into pantheism, and I’ll sketch my 
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concern here. To recap: on Miravalle’s proposal, nonexistent dogs have 
being. God is the property of existence, and perhaps even the property of 
necessary existence (110). Existence is God’s essence. God then bestows 
existence on a suitable selection of meinongian objects, sharing God’s 
essence (111), and refraining from bestowing it on others. We can infer that 
the meinongian conception of being as independent from God’s existence 
is required for those canine features to do their discriminatory work; oth-
erwise, one would be able to save ordinary panentheism from collapse into 
pantheism simply by pointing out that dogs have fur and God does not.
Miravalle accepts the usual meinongian position with respect to dis-
tinguishing non-existent objects. They are objectively distinguished from 
each other by their properties (57). This is the source of the so-called mei-
nongian population explosion; there are infinite faceless men in bowler 
hats, distinguished by tiny variations in the fabric of their suits, and all of 
them are wedged in my doorway. Before the non-existent dog is created, 
all of its properties are essential to it. A difference in property makes for a 
different non-existent dog.
After the dog—call her Fluffy—is created, gaining the property exist-
ence from God’s essence, we can ask what is essential to her now. There are 
three alternatives: (1) all the properties, (2) some properties, but not oth-
ers, or (3) none of the properties. We can strike the third alternative easily; 
if none of Fluffy’s doggy properties are essential to her, then it seems that 
they could hardly do the work of distinguishing the dog from other crea-
tures, let alone God. This alternative leads to the Parmenidean conclusion 
that Miravalle hopes to avoid: “everything is existence, one and homoge-
nous, without change or variation” (114).
If all of the properties of Fluffy (post-creation) are essential to her, then 
Fluffy would essentially exist, and thus be elevated to be on a par with 
God. Or, to put it another way, if existence is just a property like all the 
other properties, and all of the properties of Fluffy are essential to her, 
then one must conclude that God, as existence, is ontically on a par with 
Fluffy’s left ear and waggly tail. If Fluffy’s properties are essential to her, 
it seems that the meinongian can’t avoid the conclusion that God has been 
reduced to the level of creatures (112).
There’s a deeper objection that pushes on the distinction between being 
and existence that meinongianism requires. If all of Fluffy’s properties are 
essential to Fluffy, Fluffy can’t be identical to the non-existent dog that 
God chose to create. The non-existent dog—call it Duffy—did not have 
the property of existence, and non-existent objects are to be distinguished 
entirely by their properties. Moreover, there is still a non-existent dog, 
Duffy, that is just like Fluffy, except that it lacks the relevant property 
of existence. One might respond that after Fluffy is created, there is no 
longer a Duffy; Duffy created just is Fluffy. We can imagine a philosophi-
cal library full of extremely coincidental fiction, which tells the adventures 
of a fictional dog who just so happens to have every property that Fluffy 
has (minus existence.) Fluffy is a real dog, not a fictional dog, so the stories 
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can’t be about her, so the meinongian still needs to postulate a Duffy to 
make sense of those kinds of sentences. According to Miravalle, however, 
the non-existents are prior to creation, so we would need a Duffy and a 
Fluffy prior to creation in order to explain Duffy-sentences post creation, 
as the Duffy sentences are not about Fluffy. Prior to creation, however, 
Duffy and Fluffy have all of the same properties, and so must be identical.
Let’s turn to the final alternative. Some of the properties of Fluffy are 
essential to Fluffy, but not all of them. This seems to be most in spirit with 
Miravalle’s proposal, whereby God chooses which beings to bring into 
existence, and most in spirit with common sense, whereby we regularly 
ignore Cambridge-changes and accept that some properties of beings 
can change without destroying the being. On this alternative, existence 
is a property that Fluffy has, but existence is not part of Fluffy’s essence.
Non-existence or so-called mere being is also a property that Fluffy had, 
but non-existence cannot be part of Fluffy’s essence, because Fluffy now 
exists due to God’s free choice. If being is a property, then it seems there 
are a couple of options. Being could be a property characteristic of mei-
nongian objects. Meinongian objects have being; ordinary existing objects 
have existence. If Fluffy exists, then Fluffy is no longer an object that has 
the being characteristic of non-existent objects.
Recall, however, that being was supposed to distinguish meinongian 
objects from God. They’re prior to creation. If Fluffy exists, Fluffy no longer 
has the right kind of being. Moreover, Fluffy’s other properties can’t do 
the work of distinguishing God from Fluffy, because if they could, there’d 
be no motivation for introducing meinongianism. It seems that we can 
distinguish between non-existents and God easily, but we cannot distin-
guish between existents in God, which is no help in avoiding pantheism.
Miravalle has some potential responses that I can see. One could claim 
that created objects retain the property of being when they gain the prop-
erty of existence. Being grounds the creature’s independence from God; 
the creature’s existence is given by God. Then one would need to explain 
the difference between being and existence, such that both could be held 
by an object at the same time, without collapsing the distinction between 
meinongian objects and existent objects. Another alternative would be 
to argue that being is not a property, but then one owes an explanation 
of what it is, and why, if being isn’t a property, existence is. Either path 
involves significant, which is not to say insurmountable, challenges.
Overall, the book is successful in taking a fascinating and controver-
sial thesis and applying it to a wide range of puzzles in analytic theol-
ogy. The book is also clear, non-technical, and remarkably accessible given 
the subject matter, and I can imagine it easily at home in a seminar for 
advanced undergraduates. As Miravalle acknowledges, the book is more 
of the beginning of a conversation about meinongianism and theism than 
an attempt to have a final word, and I expect that the philosophical con-
versations that it provokes will be both fruitful and creative.
